6 May 2011

Understanding Syria: Scorecard for a Civil War?

Scorecard for a Civil War?

I hope that the subtitle of this is just a joke in bad taste and not a prediction but … if it comes to it, I guess that’s what it is. I thought it might be useful to do a quick review of Syria’s current make up and how that might factor in to any future civil war or, hopefully, more peaceful changes.

Anyway, to start off, Syria is not a simple country: there are multiple languages and multiple sects of multiple religions and, just to make matters more complicated, multiple centers for the country … and that sort of fractionalism is inherent, even before we get on the subject of political affiliations and views!

Before I try to make some sense of the current ‘balance of forces’ (or whatever you call it) between pro-government and the opposition, I’ll run down some of the basics of who is involved.
So, to start with the easiest: most Syrians live either along the coast, in the strip between the mountains that run parallel to the Mediterranean and the desert or in the Euphrates River valley, though in the steppes and mountains and even in the desert, you’ll find people. There’s something around 21 million of us.

The country is called the Syrian Arab Republic but, while most people are Arabs (88% or so), there are real language minorities.

Arabic is the main language here and most Syrian Arabic is fairly similar. You do hear noticeable accent differences between the main cities as well as between city and country and even some sects; however, those have gotten significantly less pronounced with the steady rise of mass media and mass education over the last century. Unlike in some other Arab countries, proficiency and education in Arabic is considered a mark of a good education.

After Arabic, Kurmanji Kurdish is widely spoken in far northeast but there are sizable numbers of Kurds in all the cities; sometimes, one gets the impression that tea delivery and waitstaff are mainly Kurds. However, most Kurds who have moved to the cities have lost their language within a generation or two.

You’ll also find Armenian spoken in many of the cities; both Damascus and Aleppo have sizable Armenian communities and their distinct script is common enough on signs. There’ve been Armenians here for a long time but the largest growth was during the Armenian genocide when large numbers of them fled from Turkish and Kurdish areas to the north; for some reason, at that time, the Arabic speakers welcomed the refugees regardless of religion.

There are also considerable numbers of Turks, both in the north and scattered through the country, but over time they have been assimilating in to the Arab population. Similarly, during the Circassian genocide, a great many muslims from the North Caucasus fled here (my great grandmother was one) and while keeping a sense of their identity, the languages have all but disappeared.

One language oddity of Syria is the survival of Aramaic in Ma`lula,and two neighbouring villages, just 35 miles northeast of Damascus. That language is a Semitic one roughly medial between Arabic and Hebrew and was the common language here and in Palestine at the time of Jesus. Outside Ma’lula, it only survives as a liturgical language.

So, having briefly looked at the main language groups, we’re almost done with the simplest definitions of ethnicity: overwhelmingly Arab, with a sizable Kurdish minority and a little bit of some others. However, within the Arab population, there’s an important distinction to make before we turn to religion: refugees.

After the 1948 Palestine War, the vast majority of the Arab population was forcibly expelled from what would become the State of Israel. Many of those came here. Today, they and their descendants number around 600,000 and mainly live near the larger cities in what are designated as refugee camps. However, a visit to the largest of them, Yarmouk just outside Damascus, is hardly distinguishable from any other working class suburb except for the prevalence of Palestinian flags and names. In terms of law and practice, Palestinians in Syria have most of the same rights (or lack thereof) of everyone else except that they are not citizens. When they are drafted, they serve in all Palestinian units.

The other large refugee group though is very different; the Iraqis. Nearly all have come here since 2003 and they number somewhere between 1.5 and 5 million (which is in scale like the US taking in between 22 and 75 million refugees!). While those with money have fled largely to Jordan or Dubai or further, most of the Iraqis here were ordinary people who fled the sectarian conflict there; somewhere between a third and a half are Christian with nearly all the rest Sunni Muslim. In the past few years, this migration has had an immense impact on Syria. Iraqi slums have sprung up around most cities as well as a distinct Iraqi culture in exile (the Iraqi diaspora includes a lot of educated and skilled people, no longer wanted in the ‘New Iraq’). It’s also meant the growth of a sex industry as destitute Iraqi women have turned to prostitution. You see Iraqi beggars all the time now.

Now, to turn to the ever thorny subject of religion. Most – around 87% -- of Syrians are Muslim, while about 10% are Christians and 3% are Druze, which would be simple enough if those were the only categories.

The smallest group, the Druze, are the most coherent. There are close to 500,000 of them with the largest concentration in the Jabal al-Druze. The province of Suweida is majority Druze and, historically, the Druze have been some of the most nationalistic people in Syria. The Great National Uprising against the French occupation in 1925 was started and largely led by the Druze. There are also Druze elsewhere, mainly in the southern part of the country, and they were the only Syrians not expelled from the Jaulan after the Israeli occupation began.
The Christians are possibly the most divided amongst themselves with a host of rival patriarchates. I sometimes joke that Damascus leads the world in ‘popes’; there are currently three different Patriarchs based here – the Syriac Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Melkite – all of whom claim to be the legitimate heir of Antioch and equal to Constantinople and Alexandria. And there are at least half a dozen more rival indigenous Christian churches (Maronites, Jacobites, Chaldaeans, Assyrians, Armenians), most of which have their own splinter groups … as well as more modern protestant groups! Most of the Christian divisions are based on splits within the Christian Church when it had state power, between the time of the Roman Emperors Constantine and Heraclius (325-641), though further exacerbated by the Crusades. The majority of the Christians – with the exception of the Armenians and some Assyrians – identify themselves strongly as Arabs (Arab Christians preceded Islam by a long while here; Damascus, Homs, and Palmyra, for instance, were Arab towns long before Muhammad).

Formerly, there was also a significant Jewish community here and, like the Christian community, it largely self-identified as Syrian and Arab. Large scale emigration, mainly to New York City, saw it steadily shrink despite strong efforts from the rest of the community to stamp out Anti-Semitism; in 1949, after the first war with Israel, a bomb was planted in the Menarsha Synagogue here and 12 Jews were killed; the government rushed to punish the bombers and the Syrian President strongly condemned attacks on Jews and visited the wounded while the state worked to restore the syangogue. That was the Damascus Way. From that time, Jews were exempted from the draft but otehrwise had the same rights (or rather lack of rights) everyone else had. Most of the Jewish community, though, immigrated to the USA in 1992 when George Bush demanded that they leave and granted them all green cards (it was a time of severe economic crisis here so I doubt any Syrian would have refused the offer!)

Finally, we come to the Muslim population. Most of the Muslims – 74% of the total of the country – are Sunnis, including nearly all the Kurds and Turks as well as most of the Palestinians. However, despite our numeric preponderance, there has not been a Sunni head of state in nearly half a century!

The remainder self-identify as varieties of Shia; perhaps 1-2% Ismaili, less than 1% Imami (or Twelver) and the rest Alawi. The Ismailis are mainly found in a few towns like Masyaf and are theoretically led by the Agha Khan; formerly, they were known as hashishiyun – from which the English word Assassin derives – and were famous during the period of the Crusades. The Imami Shia are the same group as found in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon but are few in number here.
The Alawi, though, are perhaps the largest and possibly the oddest of Syria’s minorities. Many people debate whether their religion should really be counted as being Shia, let alone Muslim, as it deviates from other Islamic groups in many ways: they see Ali as an incarnation of the diety, believe in reincarnation, deny that women have souls, teach that the stars are incarnated believers, and other oddities. They don’t follow Islamic dietary and drinking rules and don’t fast during Ramadan though they do ceebrate Christmas. Unfortunately, they also teach that followers should always deny their religion so it is very difficult to learn what they actually believe. Alawi women are, according to their belief, not to be instructed at all in religion as they lack souls. (Oddly, Usama Bin Laden’s mother was a Syrian Alawi). Formerly, most Alawis lived in the mountains behind Tartus and Latakia but, ever since they began to dominate the society, many have moved to the cities, especially Homs and Damascus, where government jobs or contracts were available.

When it comes to a potential sectarian conflict, the key division is between the Alawis and the Sunni majority. Of course, all these groups contain quite a range of belief within them; one finds atheists and agnostics coming from every religious group as well as fanatic believers. As to Sunni Islam here, one important fact to bear in mind, in addition to its internal diversity, is that a conservative Syrian Muslim is likely to be seen by an Afghan or Saudi as a flaming liberal! Here, the burqa is a strange garment; Islamists promote education for women (for instance, when Asad introduced and repealed a ban on the niqab, the face veil, it was for teachers); there are female judges in Islamic courts and women preachers … even the most religiously strict here see the Taliban as backwards savages.

Now, one final thing before I turn to sketching the political divisions that’s worth remembering is that Syria is itself a multi-polar country. Unlike some other states in the region (iraq, Jordan, Lebanon), there is no single city that stands above the others. Damascus is the second largest city and capital but Aleppo is larger and has its own pride; never tell an Aleppine that Damascus is the best (or vice versa)! Homs is only a little bit smaller than Damascus and Latakia and Hama are both quite large. So, there’s no single city that is where ‘everything happens’ nor do they all follow the same political lines.

Finally … POLITICS!

Syria is formally a republic, though recently it has come to resemble a monarchy. The Constitution defines Syria as a secular socialist state with Islam recognised as the majority religion. There is supposed to be a president, two vice presidents, a prime minister, and a council of ministers but, since the early 1970’s at least, all power has been – allegedly – in the hands of the president. By law, the president is supposed to be a Muslim, though there is no state religion. When Hafez Asad came to power, there was some question whether he, as an Alawi, qualified; at that time, Alawis were legally recognized as Muslims, based on a 1936 Fatwa issued by Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem. There are ‘elections’ every seven years for the presidency but the winner has been a foregone conclusion of late.

Similarly, there are elections for the parliament but there, 2/3rds of seats are automatically given to the ruling coalition. As the constitution is currently written, Article 8 states, "the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party leads the state and society." The President is the Secretary-General of the party, and leader of the National Progressive Front, the name of the governing coalition which includes all the legal parties: the Arab Socialist Movement, Arab Socialist Union, Communist Party of Syria (Unified), Communist Party of Syria (Bakdash), Social Democratic Unionists, Socialist Unionists, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Democratic Socialist Unionist Party, Arabic Democratic Unionist Party, National Vow Movement.

The removal of Article 8 and the guarantee of the position of government parties top the demands of most of us in the opposition: we are glad to see the lifting of emergency law and closing of state security courts, even if those are at this point just paper acts.

While officially a multi-party state – on paper – this is obviously a one party state and a dictatorship. And that is what we want to see ended.

So let’s look at the factions and start with the government side. Despite the apparent unity shown to the world, there are at least two major groupings within the regime. The first, sometimes called the ‘Old Guard’, are the people who remain from the time of Hafez Assad, the current president’s father and predecessor. As a group, they tend to be from military backgrounds, are mainly Alawi, and have opposed the opening of the economy in the last decade. Diplomatically, they tend to look more towards Iran as a key ally than anywhere else.
The other group, termed the ‘Young Guard’, includes Bashar Assad himself as well as many of the people he’s brought into the regime or promoted. These are heavily technocrats and few have military backgrounds. They include a lot of Sunnis, Christians, and other non-Alawis as well as better-educated Alawis. While they’ve repeatedly held out the promise of political reform, they’ve largely failed to deliver though the movement away from a socialist command economy has been both more visible and more successful. As a group, they’ve tended to look mre towards Turkey as an ally and as a model for both creating a successful Middle Eastern state and a robust economy.

Many of us here had great hopes in them; those are gone and increasingly it looks like that faction has lost out in the internal power struggles that are said to be happening. The military security establishment appears to be calling the shots on the government side and, in so doing, is both shedding blood and losing popular support.

The other legal parties are largely long since coopted but have played a role on both sides of the current conflict. Communist rank and file, for instance, have been active in the protest movement, particularly in Homs and Latakia while most of the others are leaning towards the opposition camp.

The opposition is as rife with division, of course, as everything else here; a complaint made by some government figures is that there is no clear leadership for them to talk to. There are Kurdish nationalists and autonomists in the opposition in large numbers, mainly in the northeast, as well as Islamists. With the Islamists, the largest single group is the Muslim Brotherhood but, even by their own admittance, they are far from being in the lead and were caught as much by surpise as anyone else. Contrary to some popular misperceptions, the Brotherhood has been publicly committed to democracy and renounced armed revolution decades ago. Of course, one result was a series of splits within it: the now dominant faction refused to take up arms against the state 30 years ago while a smaller group did. That group in turn divided between a majority group that came around to the peaceful path in the 1980’s and a small fraction that did not; that last fraction is mainly in exile and has been involved in international Jihadi groups but has almost no popular support outside the Euphrates valley.
Possibly, the largest group is the least coherent: it is made up of those who do not want to replace one ideological dictatorship with another one and want, instead, a democratic and open society. Unfortunately, because our politics emphasize that everyone should get along and oppression should be ended, we are arguably weaker though we are more numerous.
The state, even while it is rounding up liberal, civil society activists, claims that the opposition is led by extremists Jihadis; their own actions show that they know that to be a lie. However, just as elsewhere in the world, the bogeyman of Usama Bin Laden is being used to frighten people here and convince them to accept a lack of freedom as a small price … to preserve freedom. Bush, Obama, Netanyahu, Qaddafi, Mubarak, they have all tried the same game so Assad is just following in a well trod path. The regime suggests to people that the choice is between a Baathi dictatorship and the Taliban. However, the majority of Syrians reject that. So, the regime is finding its base shrinking: when putting down Deraa and Banyas, they have not been able to use the regular army (which is largely confined to base) but only heavily Alawite republican guard units and party militias. To keep those forces upbeat, the notion that the Sunni majority is waiting to massacre the Alawi minority has to be endlessly repeated. However, by carrying out attrocities, they make that more rather than less likely.

If it does come to civil war, it will happen when the regular army mutinies and turns its guns en masse against the regime. SO far, such mutinies as have happened have been of individual soldiers or small units. That may not last forever. When that happens, though, the war may go quickly, in which case the massacres will be limited. The ‘Young Guard’ and the Progressive Front parties might paly a key role in rapidly switching sides ….

On the other hand, if they don’t, it could be a long drawn out affair which, by the nature of the society, will rapidly turn into sectarian massacre. The role of Iraqi refugees may be as killers for both sides …

The best hope for everyone is for a quick end to the regime: that is the best solution for all Syria’s factions and sects …

6 comments:

shackson said...

Thanks for that excellent brief insight into the state of affairs in Syria. Was just reading about your blog on The Guardian website in the UK and wanted to take a look.

I hope your bravery and that of others succeeds in bringing about a revolution and I look forward to having the chance to visit your wonderful and interesting country in the near future.

mlarrison said...

Thank you for shedding light on the history and current state of Syria. I wish you, your family, your friends and all others in pursuit of freedom the best.

I look forward to following your blogs.

Jeremy said...

Hi,

I'm a Radio New Zealand producer. Are you available for either phone or skype interviews?

Jeremy Rose
jeremy.rose[at]radionz.co.nz

Elizabeth Tsurkov said...

I'm a big fan of your blog, but the info you provide here about the Jewish community is incorrect. Prior to 1948 there were about 45,000 Jews in Syria, most living in Aleppo and Damascus. In 1945 pogroms against the community erupted (Jewish property was burned and looted) and immigration to Palestine was restricted. In 1949, banks were ordered to freeze all assets of Jews and confiscate them. As a result, 15,000 Jews left Syria until 1948 (most to the US). By 1976, only about 4,000 Jews remained in Syria.

Gila Monster said...

Howdy from sunny Phx, Az!

I was going to say almost word for word what shackson said, lol.

Here's to hoping the best for you and yours. good luck and keep posting

Veganovich said...

I love your blog and hope you stay safe. However, I take issue with your statement that “Contrary to some popular misperceptions, the Brotherhood has been publicly committed to democracy.” Anyone who is paying attention knows that the Brotherhood is “publicly committed to democracy.” But there is a real question of whether they are being truthful when they publically commit to democracy.

There are no instances of Islamists coming to power and remaining committed to democracy. (I know some will say Turkey, but given the role of the army, the Islamists could not impose their will, given the role of the very secular army.) Of course when they are out of power, Islamists will say they support democracy. But as Ali Belhadj said at the same time his party was demanding democratic elections in Algeria, “There is no democracy because the only source of power is Allah through the Koran, and not the people. If the people vote against the law of God, this is nothing other than blasphemy. In this case, it is necessary to kill the non-believers for the good reason that they wish to substitute their authority for that of God.”

I hope if the Islamists in Syria gain power, they will be less violent towards non-believers than the Salafists in Cairo that killed ten Coptic Christians today, but I am not hopeful.

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